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Justice	after	war:	innovations	and	challenges	of
Colombia’s	Special	Jurisdiction	for	Peace
Colombia’s	Special	Jurisdiction	for	Peace	aims	to	generate	pathways	to	justice	that	are	acceptable	both	to	victims
and	to	a	deeply	polarised	nation.	If	this	novel	and	innovative	institution	can	achieve	a	fair	and	effective	form	of
transitional	justice	that	encompasses	truth,	justice,	reparations,	and	guarantees	of	non-recurrence,	the	country
could	make	a	significant	shift	into	a	new	phase	of	peacebuilding	and	violence-reduction,	write	Gwen
Burnyeat	(UCL	Anthropology),	Par	Engstrom	(UCL	Americas),	Andrei	Gómez	Suárez	(University	of
Bristol),	and	Jenny	Pearce	(LSE	Latin	America	and	Caribbean	Centre)	following	their	joint	hosting	of	a	series	of
events	with	Giovani	Álvarez	(Chief	Prosecutor	of	the	Special	Jurisdiction’s	Investigation	and	Accusation	Unit).
How	to	address	massive	human	rights	violations	and	war	crimes	following	the	negotiation	of	a	peace	agreement	is
one	of	humanity’s	most	painful	tasks.	On	the	one	hand,	the	parties	to	the	conflict	are	unlikely	to	seek	to	end	it	while
faced	with	the	prospect	of	long	prison	sentences.	On	the	other,	the	victims,	traumatised	by	loss	and	personal
suffering,	also	require	justice	for	the	crimes	committed	against	them	and	their	loved	ones.
“Victims	traumatised	by	loss	and	personal	suffering	require	justice	for	the	crimes	committed	against
them	and	their	loved	ones”	(Barrancabermeja,	Andrés	Cortés/CICR,	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Recognition	of	their	experiences	through	concrete	action	is	vital	if	they	are	to	move	forward	and	reconcile	with	the
past	and	the	perpetrators.	This	in	turn	impacts	on	the	collective,	societal	prospects	for	taking	steps	towards	a	future
with	peacebuilding	at	its	heart.
The	South	African	Truth	Commission	was	a	turning	point	in	acknowledging	the	vital	importance	of	truth	telling	in
peacemaking.	Variants	of	this	approach	were	replicated	in	Guatemala,	El	Salvador,	and	Peru,	the	latter	becoming
in	2003	the	first	truth	commission	to	hold	public	hearings	and	recommend	reforms,	prosecutions,	and	reparations.
However,	the	ideal	balance	between	truth,	justice,	reparations,	and	guarantees	of	non-recurrence	has	yet	to	be
found.
Colombia	and	the	Special	Jurisdiction	for	Peace
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The	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC),	created	by	the	Rome	Statute	in	1998,	brought	in	new	obligations	in	terms	of
addressing	grave	violations	of	human	rights	and	international	humanitarian	law.	As	a	signatory	to	the	ICC	in	2002,
Colombia	was	the	first	country	to	negotiate	a	peace	agreement	which	had	to	respect	these	obligations.	The	Special
Jurisdiction	for	Peace	(JEP)	was	thus	created	in	the	shadow	of	the	ICC,	meaning	that	Colombia	could	not	offer
judicial	pardons	for	gross	human	rights	violations;	Colombian	society’s	right	to	peace	instead	had	to	be
synchronised	with	international	standards	of	justice.
Colombia’s	2016	peace	deal	sought	to	end	the	longest	civil	war	in	the	western	hemisphere	(Presidencia
El	Salvador,	public	domain)
But	this	is	not	the	only	reason	the	Colombian	transitional	justice	process	matters	to	the	world.	Colombia’s	Peace
Agreement	in	2016	sought	to	end	the	longest	civil	war	in	the	western	hemisphere,	which	dates	back	to	the
emergence	of	the	first	guerrilla	insurgency,	the	ELN,	in	1964,	and	the	army	operation	of	the	same	year	that	led	to
the	formation	of	the	peasant	self-defence	groups	that	later	became	the	FARC.	With	the	demobilisation	of	the	FARC
after	the	2016	Peace	Agreement,	the	still-active	ELN	became	the	longest-lasting	insurgency	in	the	western
hemisphere.
However,	on	top	of	its	experience	of	more	than	ten	different	guerrilla	groups,	Colombia	also	has	a	long	tradition	of
private	counterinsurgency,	including	three	generations	of	paramilitary	organisations.	Beyond	that,	a	plurality	of	large
and	small	drug	cartels	have	created	or	sponsored	death	squads	and	taken	advantage	of	Colombia’s	fertile	terrain
for	criminal	economies.	Civilians	have	been	deeply	affected,	and	the	state	now	recognises	almost	9	million
victims,	which	equates	to	roughly	18	per	cent	of	the	population.
Given	this	long	and	complex	history	of	violence,	the	task	of	implementing	the	Peace	Agreement	is	extremely
demanding,	and	the	role	of	the	JEP	in	providing	justice	is	central	to	these	efforts.
But	the	challenges	faced	by	the	JEP	are	exacerbated	by	the	socio-political	context	of	the	2016	Peace	Referendum,
in	which	the	Peace	Agreement	itself	was	rejected	by	50.2	per	cent	of	the	population.	Although	the	Agreement	was
renegotiated	and	is	now	being	implemented,	polarisation	continues	to	grow.	The	assassination	of	hundreds	of
social	leaders	and	demobilised	FARC	members	is	represents	a	particular	threat	to	the	agreement	itself.
Building	on	the	2005	Justice	and	Peace	Law
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If	Colombia	is	to	move	into	a	new	historical	stage	of	peacebuilding	and	violence	reduction,	the	state	and	the	JEP
will	need	to	show	their	ability	to	generate	pathways	for	justice	that	are	both	acceptable	to	victims	and	capable	of
convincing	a	polarised	nation	of	their	fairness	and	efficacy	in	terms	of	the	four	pillars	of	transitional	justice:	truth,
justice,	reparations,	and	guarantees	of	non-recurrence.
To	date	there	have	been	seven	peace	agreements	with	irregular	armed	groups,	but	five	of	these	did	not	include
truth,	reparation	to	victims,	or	punishment	of	perpetrators.	This	pattern	was	broken	in	2005	with	the	Justice	and
Peace	Law	(JPL),	which	resulted	from	negotiations	that	enabled	demobilisation	of	the	paramilitary	United	Self-
Defence	Forces	of	Colombia	(AUC).
Police	take	in	former	AUC	member	Hernán	Arturo	Cantillo	Camargo	(“Yovanny”),	allegedly	responsible
for	the	displacement	of	over	28,000	people	(Policía	Nacional,	CC	BY-SA	2.0)
For	the	first	time,	those	responsible	for	crimes	against	humanity,	war	crimes,	and	genocide	had	to	spend	a
maximum	of	eight	years	in	prison	in	exchange	for	disarming,	making	reparation	to	victims,	revealing	the
whereabouts	of	the	disappeared,	handing	over	recruited	minors,	truth-telling,	and	committing	to	a	cessation	of
criminal	activities.
Over	470	AUC	paramilitaries	received	sentences	for	serious	crimes,	which	is	more	than	the	number	handed	down
by	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former	Yugoslavia	or	its	counterpart	for	Rwanda.	Paramilitary
information	led	to	the	sentencing	of	over	60	congressmen/women	for	supporting	paramilitary	groups,	and	the
remains	of	4,300	of	the	forcibly	disappeared	were	identified.	Nearly	11,000	victims	of	paramilitary	groups	received
reparations.
That	said,	state	actors	and	civilian	third-party	groups	were	not	part	of	the	process,	and	some	paramilitary
commanders	continued	with	their	criminal	activities	from	prison.	The	2005	JPL	also	failed	to	offer	holistic
reparations	or	to	fully	investigate	gender-based	and	sexual	violence	as	a	weapon	of	war.
The	Special	Jurisdiction	for	Peace	and	the	Investigation	and	Accusation	Unit
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The	Havana	peace	negotiations	took	these	lessons	into	account	when	the	JEP	was	designed.	The	negotiations
also	drew	substantively	on	transitional	justice	theory	and	on	the	experiences	of	other	countries.	The	JEP	forms	part
of	the	transitional	justice	component	of	the	Peace	Agreement,	known	as	the	Comprehensive	System	for	Truth,
Justice,	Reparations	and	Guarantees	of	Non-Recurrence.	This	is	the	first	such	system	to	take	on	board	the	holistic
approach	advocated	by	transitional	justice	theory,	which	seeks	to	pave	the	way	for	national	reconciliation	through
restorative	justice.
Two	pathways	were	established	for	parties	appearing	before	the	JEP.
The	first,	the	dialogic	process,	resolves	cases	in	the	Chamber	for	Recognition	of	Responsibility.	Access	to	this
process	depends	on	fulfilment	of	the	JEP’s	four	requirements:	contribution	to	truth-telling,	recognition	of
responsibility	for	crimes	committed,	compliance	with	provision	of	reparations	to	victims,	and	commitment	to	non-
recurrence.	This	process	gives	victims	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	the	process	and	engage	directly	with	the
perpetrator,	thus	paving	the	way	for	restorative	rather	than	retributive	justice.	It	ends	with	an	alternative,	non-prison-
based	sentence.
The	second,	the	adversarial	pathway,	involves	the	Investigation	and	Accusation	Unit	(IAU).	This	body	is	responsible
for	investigating	those	who	do	not	fulfil	the	four	requirements,	and	it	can	refer	cases	to	JEP	magistrates	for	trial,
where	defendants	can	ultimately	receive	jail	sentences	of	up	to	20	years	if	they	fail	to	acknowledge	their
responsibilities	before	a	verdict	is	reached.	In	essence,	the	IAU	is	the	JEP’s	dissuasive	arm,	aiming	to	encourage
perpetrators	to	accept	the	dialogic	process	and	build	towards	national	reconciliation.
The	JEP	has	a	15-year	mandate.	It	is	comprised	of	five	bodies:	three	chambers,	a	Special	Tribunal	for	Peace,	and
the	IAU.	Together,	these	different	bodies	perform	various	important	functions:
granting	amnesties	to	FARC	ex-combatants	that	have	not	been	charged	with	grave	crimes
receiving	state	agents	and	third	parties	that	voluntarily	apply	for	their	cases	to	be	considered	by	the	JEP
reviewing	the	cases	of	those	who	already	have	cases	open	against	them	or	are	serving	sentences	handed
down	within	the	ordinary	justice	system
enabling	dialogic	processes	for	parties	to	recognise	their	responsibilities	for	crimes	committed	directly	or
indirectly	in	the	conflict
issuing	sentences
The	JEP	is	autonomous	and	independent;	the	ordinary	courts	cannot	appeal	decisions	made	by	the	JEP.	Its
magistrates	and	the	chief	prosecutor	were	elected	by	an	international	selection	committee	created	via	the	peace
agreement.
The	IAU	is	the	only	component	of	the	JEP	with	a	team	of	judicial	police	investigators	as	well	as	a	team	of	forensic
experts.	It	also	has	special	teams	for	investigating	cases	of	gender-based	violence,	for	ensuring	an	ethnically
sensitive	approach,	and	for	issuing	protection	orders	for	threatened	victims,	witnesses,	and	parties	under
investigation.	The	fact	that	the	IAU	has	ten	regional	offices	is	particularly	important,	as	the	majority	of	victims	live	in
rural,	hard-to-reach	areas.
The	JEP	and	hope:	navigating	the	complexities	of	post-war	Colombia
The	JEP,	and	in	particular	the	option	of	non-prison-based	sentences,	has	been	at	the	heart	of	public	controversy.
Having	been	elected	in	2018	on	a	promise	to	substantially	modify	the	Peace	Agreement,	President	Duque	himself
has	objected	to	the	statutory	law	that	governs	the	JEP.	This	act,	unprecedented	for	a	head	of	state,	undermined	the
legal	security	of	those	intending	to	appear	before	the	JEP,	even	if	his	objections	were	ultimately	overruled	by
Congress	and	the	Constitutional	Court.
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“Cases	involving	9734	former	FARC	members,	2640	members	of	the	armed	forces,	and	95	other	state
officials	are	currently	under	investigation	by	the	JEP”	(Magazin	Sursystem,	CC	BY-NC	2.0)
The	JEP	is	currently	examining	the	cases	of	12,481	people:	9734	former	FARC	members,	2640	members	of	the
armed	forces,	and	95	other	state	officials.	The	JEP	must	also	decide	whether	or	not	to	accept	more	than	900	third
parties	that	have	so	far	applied	to	enter	the	jurisdiction.
The	JEP	has	prioritised	seven	“macro-cases”,	including	the	investigation	of	kidnappings	committed	by	the	FARC,
extrajudicial	executions	committed	by	the	armed	forces,	and	the	impact	of	the	armed	conflict	on	ethnic	communities
in	the	Pacific	region.	In	2020,	the	third	year	of	the	JEP’s	existence,	we	should	begin	to	see	the	results	of	these
investigations.
Challenges	for	the	Special	Jurisdiction	for	Peace
There	are,	however,	numerous	challenges	facing	the	JEP:
1.	 Protecting	victims,	witnesses,	and	defendants
Assassinations	of	ex-combatants	have	happened	in	the	wake	of	all	previous	peace	negotiations	in
Colombia.	The	latest	report	of	the	UN	Verification	Mission	in	Colombia	found	that	173	FARC	ex-combatants
and	303	social	leaders	had	been	killed	between	the	signing	of	the	Peace	Agreement	and	the	end	of	2019,
some	by	members	of	the	army.	These	assassinations	reduce	the	probability	of	victims	coming	to	know	the
truth	and	create	fear	amongst	ex-combatants,	providing	a	fertile	climate	for	a	possible	return	to	arms.	So	far,
the	IAU	has	analysed	over	90	risk	situations	and	ordered	that	46	protection	schemes	be	assigned	to	victims
and	defendants.
2.	 Achieving	greater	legitimacy	amongst	the	wider	public
If	the	JEP’s	sentences	–	whether	alternative	or	carceral	–	are	to	contribute	to	its	holistic	vision	of	transitional
justice	and	pave	the	way	for	national	reconciliation,	it	needs	to	promote	a	climate	favourable	to	popular
support	for	its	decisions.	The	chief	prosecutor	understands	that	legitimacy	must	be	won	from	a	diversity	of
groups	with	divergent	opinions.	Strengthening	coordination	with	other	state	institutions	is	also	crucial,	given
the	well-known	propensity	in	Colombia	for	inter-institutional	coordination	failures	in	policy	implementation.	The
JEP	also	needs	to	show	convincing	results	quickly	even	though	transitional	justice	processes	are	complex
and	tend	to	take	time	to	achieve	their	aims.	The	process	involves,	after	all,	thousands	of	crimes	and	many
hundreds	of	perpetrators.
3.	 Creating	mechanisms	to	prioritise	cases	of	gender-based	violence
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The	IAU	has	helped	598	victims	of	sexual	violence	to	present	evidence	to	the	JEP,	as	well	as	designing
software	to	process	and	analyse	such	cases	(LAYNA).	This	platform	has	so	far	registered	1,400	allegations	of
criminal	actions,	and	other	state	bodies	are	able	to	use	this	information	to	prevent	victims	from	having	to
repeatedly	narrate	their	harrowing	experiences.	In	this	way,	the	JEP	can	give	real	visibility	to	these	crimes	in
Colombia	while	avoiding	revictimisation,	which	is	especially	important	given	Colombia’s	context	of	social
normalisation	or	minimisation	of	sexual	violence.
Overall,	Colombia’s	Peace	Agreement	remains	fragile.	Yet	despite	a	ticking	clock	and	a	backdrop	of	public
scepticism,	threats,	and	real	violence,	institutions	such	as	the	JEP	and	the	IAU	continue	to	make	significant	efforts
to	achieve	a	lasting	peace.
The	Colombian	case	reveals	the	need	for	transitional	justice	processes	to	be	situated	analytically	in	their	social	and
political	contexts.	These	processes	do	not	happen	in	vacuums	but	rather	in	societies	already	divided	both	by	years
of	violence	and	by	social	rifts	with	complex	historical	trajectories.
In	the	midst	of	the	many	complexities	of	post-war	Colombia,	the	JEP	is	a	process	of	global	importance.	Despite
having	to	defend	their	independence	from	political	interference,	the	JEP’s	staff	continue	to	strive	to	take	this	unique
opportunity	to	end	half	a	century	of	war	with	justice	yet	without	retribution.	This	kind	of	reconciliation	–	and	the	end
of	Colombia’s	longstanding	cycle	of	war	and	violence	–	could	serve	as	a	model	for	the	many	countries	around	the
world	still	struggling	with	their	own	situations	of	conflict	and	post-conflict.
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